On Providence (Part 1)--Where's the Beef?

One of my undergraduate professors often spoke of the tensions that are found in Scripture. The tension that came up most (as it often does) is that between divine sovereignty and human freedom (and responsibility). Most often the tension is used as a weapon against those who proudly wear the name of John Calvin. Since Calvin stressed (though not to the extent many believe--only 4 of the 70 chapters in the Institutes are explicitly about predestination) God's eternal decree of all that occurs in history, he (and those who would agree with him) is often charged with certain crimes, of which the most often cited is making God the author of sin. Whether or not Calvinism is committed to God's being the author of sin, it certainly carries with it tensions, but my professor wasn't a Calvinist by any means. He was (though he preferred to be called a 'Wesleyan') an Arminian. This means he was committed to a view of 'sovereignty' where God hasn't actively decreed anything. He uses his foreknowledge to know what is going to happen in the future. He fore-knows the radically free decisions of his creatures only because of his prescience; He does know them because he has fore-ordained them. But if this is the case, where is the tension? Why is it a problem for God to look down time's corridor and see the free will decisions of his creatures? I see no tension in this, especially when it is applied to the special act of God whereby He has elected some and passed over others. If God has elected me on the basis of my free will decision, how could there possibly be any tension in that? Consider Calvin's words,

At the outset, then, let my readers grasp that providence means not that by which God idly observes from heaven what takes place on earth, but that by which, as keeper of the keys, he governs all events. Thus it pertains no less to his hands than to his eyes (Institutes I.xvi.4).

My professor would think of sovereignty and providence as coming in a very general form. Thus, God determines the general perimeters in which men make decisions, but doesn't determine anything beyond that. God then uses his foreknowledge to know what specifically is going to happen within the general outlines He set up but does not determine the specifics of what is going to happen. So, He may determine that I shall wear clothes to work on Monday, but he hasn't determined (though He foreknows) that I shall wear a white shirt and tattered jeans. But again, I ask, where is the tension? How could it possibly be a problem that God simply knows what shirt I'm going to wear? But if Calvin is correct, the tension comes only when God determines the specifics of history including the decisions of men. He continues,

Not so crass is the error of those who attribute governance to God, but of a confused and mixed sort, as I have said, namely, one that by a general motion revolves and drives the system of the universe, with its several parts, but which does not specifically direct the actions of individual creatures (ibid, emphasis added).

It seems pretty straight forward that a providence that is not particular in nature, that is, one that doesn't include all and every event (including the decisions of men), is not in danger of coming under the title of 'tension'. It is only when there is a specific determination of specific actions of creatures that the tention arises. I think there are other problems with the 'foreknowledge' model of sovereignty and providence, but I'll leave those for other posts.