On Providence (part 3)--Different models of providence
Defining how one plans to use certain words often helps to eliminate confussion and unnecessary tension. In that spirit, here are some different models of the relationship between God's knowledge and decree and His works of providence currently in fashion amongst philosphers and theologians (keep in mind that these descriptions are not exhaustive and could be tweeked for more precision).
Open Theism- On the Openness model, God has chosen to limit his knowledge of the future actions of His creatures in order to allow for the libertarian freedom of His creatures. God, then, does not have foreknowledge of what is to happen in the future and must, as a result, respond after the fact to the varying situations He encounters in the world. As a result of this self-limitation on God's part, He takes risks in governing the world, although this doesn't mean that God's purposes are in question. He intends and has the power to accomplish all He plans. Major proponents include John Sanders, William Hasker and Greg Boyd.
Simple Foreknowledge- As proponents of this brand of providence and foreknowledge argue, God has full knowledge of all things future, including the actions of creatures who possess libertarian freefom. In having such knowledge God is able to govern his creation. This foreknowledge, however, does not cause the decisions made by free humans but only renders them certain. Because God knows the future, He can use that knowledge to ensure his plans come to fruition and is this is true despite humans possessing libertarian freedom. As a result, God is not a risk-taker. Dave Hunt has been a prominent contemporary adherent and Jacob Arminius figures historically as an important adherent to the doctrine.
Molinism- According to Molinism, God has an added dimension to His knowledge, namely what is caled 'middle knowledge'. Middle knowledge is that knowledge which is sandwhiched between God's knowledge of necessary truths (i.e., 2 + 2=4) and God's knowledge of his own will of creation (thus, it is called middle knowledge). Middle knowledge includes God's knowledge of what are called counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, that is, He knows what every possible creature would do in every possible situation. Thus, God is able to choose, by combining His middle knowledge and the knowledge of His plan, which world He wishes to be the actual world. God, according to Molinism, does not taking risks in his governing the world. This model of providence as with the previous two, employs a libertarian notion of freedom. Its adherents include (of course) Louis de Molina and such contemporary philosophers and theologians as Thomas P. Flint and William Lane Craig.
Calvinism- Calvin and those of his ilk maintain that God has knowledge of the future because he has foreordained the future. Whereas on the simple foreknowledge and molinist doctrines, God's foreordination is subsequent to and dependent upon some form of foreknowledge, on the Calvinist model, God knows his own will and what He plans to bring about (or allow to come about) in the accomplishment of His plan. This foreordination, then, includes every decision each human will make. It follows from this that God does not take risks when He governs His world and humans do not possess liberatarian freedom, but are free in a compatibilist sense. John Calvin, John M. Frame and Paul Helm hold to this particular doctrine of providence.
Liberatarian Freedom- According to libertarian theories of freedom, a person performs an action freely if and only if at the time the action is performed the person is free to perform the action and free to refrain from the action, that is, the decision is determined by the agent and not by anything inside or outside of the agent. This brand of freedom is seen to be incompatible with determinism of any sort.
Compatibilist Freedom- Compatibilists hold that a person is free in performing an action if and only if at the time of the action the person is determined by his strongest desire to perform (or refrain from performing) the action. A person's being free in this sense, then, is compatible with determism.
Open Theism- On the Openness model, God has chosen to limit his knowledge of the future actions of His creatures in order to allow for the libertarian freedom of His creatures. God, then, does not have foreknowledge of what is to happen in the future and must, as a result, respond after the fact to the varying situations He encounters in the world. As a result of this self-limitation on God's part, He takes risks in governing the world, although this doesn't mean that God's purposes are in question. He intends and has the power to accomplish all He plans. Major proponents include John Sanders, William Hasker and Greg Boyd.
Simple Foreknowledge- As proponents of this brand of providence and foreknowledge argue, God has full knowledge of all things future, including the actions of creatures who possess libertarian freefom. In having such knowledge God is able to govern his creation. This foreknowledge, however, does not cause the decisions made by free humans but only renders them certain. Because God knows the future, He can use that knowledge to ensure his plans come to fruition and is this is true despite humans possessing libertarian freedom. As a result, God is not a risk-taker. Dave Hunt has been a prominent contemporary adherent and Jacob Arminius figures historically as an important adherent to the doctrine.
Molinism- According to Molinism, God has an added dimension to His knowledge, namely what is caled 'middle knowledge'. Middle knowledge is that knowledge which is sandwhiched between God's knowledge of necessary truths (i.e., 2 + 2=4) and God's knowledge of his own will of creation (thus, it is called middle knowledge). Middle knowledge includes God's knowledge of what are called counterfactuals of creaturely freedom, that is, He knows what every possible creature would do in every possible situation. Thus, God is able to choose, by combining His middle knowledge and the knowledge of His plan, which world He wishes to be the actual world. God, according to Molinism, does not taking risks in his governing the world. This model of providence as with the previous two, employs a libertarian notion of freedom. Its adherents include (of course) Louis de Molina and such contemporary philosophers and theologians as Thomas P. Flint and William Lane Craig.
Calvinism- Calvin and those of his ilk maintain that God has knowledge of the future because he has foreordained the future. Whereas on the simple foreknowledge and molinist doctrines, God's foreordination is subsequent to and dependent upon some form of foreknowledge, on the Calvinist model, God knows his own will and what He plans to bring about (or allow to come about) in the accomplishment of His plan. This foreordination, then, includes every decision each human will make. It follows from this that God does not take risks when He governs His world and humans do not possess liberatarian freedom, but are free in a compatibilist sense. John Calvin, John M. Frame and Paul Helm hold to this particular doctrine of providence.
Liberatarian Freedom- According to libertarian theories of freedom, a person performs an action freely if and only if at the time the action is performed the person is free to perform the action and free to refrain from the action, that is, the decision is determined by the agent and not by anything inside or outside of the agent. This brand of freedom is seen to be incompatible with determinism of any sort.
Compatibilist Freedom- Compatibilists hold that a person is free in performing an action if and only if at the time of the action the person is determined by his strongest desire to perform (or refrain from performing) the action. A person's being free in this sense, then, is compatible with determism.
posted by Josh at 7:45 PM
2 Comments:
Now matter how nice and objective you try to be it's just really hard to make Silly...I mean Simple Foreknowledge sound good huh?
Tereo-kensai,
Thanks for your thoughts. As you mentioned, I could have been more precise and I guess now is a good reason to do so, as you bring up good points.
As to the brand of Open Theism (OT) I describe...I find it difficult sometimes to get at exactly what these guys are talking about. Sometimes they seems to conflate the two different kinds of position. Hasker, in his "The Antinomies of Divine Providence" (Philosopia Christi [4.2, 2002]) speaks of both, God's self-limitation and the unknowability of the future. As he notes there, the consistent form of OT is the one that maintains contingent future propositions are unknowable.
As to freedom...I agree that (PAP) as used by liberatarians is rather ambigues and is consistent with either liberatarian or compatibilist views of freedom. You are also correct to point out that our desires are part of who we are. I was simply following the standard compatibilistic use of the phrase. I meant by the phrase that we must and can only act in accordance with, on the basis of (cash this out how you wish) our strongest desire at the moment we choose. And these desires flow out of, as you note, our more fundamental nature or ethical disposition. My point was (and is) the same as yours, though you make it more eloquently!
I appreciate your thoughts.
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